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I.

INTRODUCTION

Much of the debate regarding the unbundled
network element ("UNE") costing provisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act")
has thus far largely focused on two issues: (1)
whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has been given jurisdiction under
the 1996 Act to impose its Total Element Long
Run Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") UNE costing
scheme on the states; and (2) whether one costing methodology or the other will provide just
compensation as required by the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 The first of these issues was recently resolved by the United States Supreme Court's decision to grant the FCC authority over the
determination of UNE costing. 2 In the context of
the second issue, this article proposes that another critical and largely overlooked issue lurking
on the jurisprudence horizon is whether the recent sea change that has occurred in the Supreme
Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence in the land
use context will influence the way the Courts of
Appeals and ultimately the United States
Supreme Court reviews incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") claims of unjust compensation resulting from the various UNE costing
methodologies.
At what point private property is said to be
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I See, e.g., E. Sanderson Hoe & Stephen Ruscus, Taking
Aim and the Takings Argument: Using Forward-LookingPricing

Methodologies to Price Unbundled Network Elements, 5 CoMMlAw

231 (1997) (arguing that the TELRIC unbundled element pricing methodology is not a taking); J. GregCONSPEcrus

ory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach
of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 851 (1996) (argu-

'taken' and, thus, at what point a private party is
entitled to compensation has long been the subject of debate. In particular, recent developments
in Takings Clause jurisprudence have left open
the following question: Should the point at which
a government regulation becomes a taking depend on whose private property is taken-a private individual putting her property to private use
or a private individual putting her property to
public use? This question has taken on renewed
importance recently in traditional public utility
sectors, such as telecommunications, which are increasingly subject to regulations meant to spur
competition. This paper analyzes whether the
FCC's and the states' recently adopted forwardlooking costing methodologies provide the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve this
question.
This paper begins with an analysis of the development of physical and regulatory Takings Clause
jurisprudence both in the land use and common
carriage contexts. In light of this case law, this
paper argues that a divergence in confiscatory takings jurisprudence would be inconsistent with
past practices. It also argues that such a divergence would be unjustified. The paper then discusses the legal and regulatory issues surrounding
the debate over whether forward-looking costing
methodologies violate the Takings Clause. It ana-

ing that open-access regulation in the telecommunications
field and cost recovery through efficient component pricing
effectuate a taking). One recent article has correctly asserted
that "neither the Takings Clause nor the regulatory contract
precludes the use of forward-looking costs in setting prices
for network elements or access to local exchange service."
William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings,
Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037 (1997).
2 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., __ U.S. _, 1999 WL
24568 (Jan. 25, 1999), reversing, Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 120
F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997).
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lyzes the FCC§s forward-looking methodology for
the pricing of ILEC unbundled elements in the
Local Competition Report and Order," as well as state
approval of arbitration agreements with such pricing methodologies. It then reviews the FCC§s rationale in adopting the TELRIC pricing methodology, and analyzes whether TELRIC is consistent
with existing Takings Clause case law. The paper
argues that, although the 1996 Act may prescribe
a physical taking, the TELRIC unbundled elements costing methodology, or any costing methodology, does not alone deny ILECsjust compensation. In a legal sense, the methodology chosen
is largely irrelevant to whether a taking has occurred. 4 Of course, this may be of little comfort
to ILECs that want to charge more and Competitive Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs") who want
to pay less for the purchase of UNEs. 5 This paper
continues, the application of this pricing methodology through mandatory arbitrated rates will
constitute a taking if ILECs are not sufficiently
compensated by purchasers of UNEs so that the
financial integrity of the ILEC is threatened. Further, even if the ILEC is sufficiently compensated,
a reviewing court could subject the regulations to
the same standard of review it imposes upon land
use regulation. In spite of valid public policyjusti3 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition
Report and Order].
4 It is important to note that this paper limits its analysis
to the constitutionality of TELRIC under the Takings Clause,
not whether it is the appropriate costing methodology under
the 1996 Act. For an analysis of which costing methodology
is more appropriate under the 1996 Act, see GTE South, Inc.
v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that,
under the language of Section 252(d) (1) (a) of the 1996 Act,
a forward-looking costing methodology is more appropriate).
5 This paper would not for a moment argue that the
methodology chosen is irrelevant to the resulting price
charged. It does note, however, that any model, whether forward-looking or based on embedded costs, can be designed
to result in excessive compensation or too little compensation. Thus, as will be discussed, the real issue is whether payment is, adequate, not whether the methodology is adequate.
6 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2 (1765); see also
RiCHARD

A.

EPSTEIN,

TAKINGS:

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE

22 (1985); Bernard Schwartz,
Takings Clause-'PoorRelation' No More?, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 417,
418 (1994); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

COLUM. L. REv. 782, 785-90 (1995). Moreover, Article 28 of

the Magna Carta barred crown officials from "tak[ing] anyone's grain or other chattels, without immediately paying for
them in money." MAGNA CARTA art. 28 (1215), reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND

fications for upholding a forward-looking costing
methodology (or any methodology), the courts
could overturn such regulations if there is no essential nexus or if a rough proportionality analysis
is absent. This paper finally recommends that the
inclusion of such analysis by state or federal regulators would serve as a useful insurance policy
should the Supreme Court determine that the
new world of Takings Clause jurisprudence encompasses telecommunications carrier rate regulation.

II.

THE CASE LAW ON TAKINGSCLARIFYING THE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERS
AND THE STATE

According to Blackstone, the third absolute
right of men is that of property, subject only to
the laws of the land. 6 In order to protect such a
right, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution states, "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.

'7

Under

the govern-

ment's power of eminent domain, 8 private property may be taken, but only pursuant to some
BILL OF RIGHTS 11,

16 (Richard L. Perry &John C. Cooper

eds., 1959).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978). In addition, the Supreme Court
has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that government's pay just compensation when property is taken for public use. See Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980);
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). Lau-

rence H. Tribe notes that Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska was the
first time that the first Supreme Court held a state government taking of property for a private purpose violates the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457-58 n.3 (1978).
Brian Blaesser and Alan Weinstein note that "the substantive
standard in a government [taking] of property is now identical under" both the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
BRAN W. BLAESSER, LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 210
(Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
8 Kurt H. Garber, Eminent Domain: When Does a Temporary
Denial of Access Become a Compensable Taking?, 25 U. MEM. L.
REV. 271, 276 (1994). The power of eminent domain enables
the federal government to take private property for public
use through a condemnation hearing. See id. Thus, in order
to take private property the federal government must condemn the private property and pay its owner just compensation for it. See id.
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stated public purpose9 and in exchange for just
compensation. 10
The evolution of takings case law can be characterized as one of increased protection of property
rights by the Supreme Court in response to the
ever-expanding reach of government regulation.
Traditionally, Takings Clause protections were applied only to the land use context and were limited to physical appropriations of private property. 1 Such physical takings were recognized as
per se compensable at an early stage in Takings
Clause jurisprudence. 12 It was not until earlier in
this century that the Supreme Court recognized
confiscatory or regulatory taking, which occurs

when a police power regulation goes "too far" in
limiting the use of private property.' 3 Both physical and confiscatory takings require the government to pay just compensation to the owner of
the property. 14 In spite of these developments,
the Supreme Court has noted that physical invasions more easily give rise to Takings Clause pro5
tection.'
In the non-land use context, the most recent
tests for confiscatory regulations-essential nexus
and rough proportionality-have not yet been
applied. In particular, although the Takings
Clause protects privately controlled common carriers1 6 from confiscatory government regula-

9 A law is more likely to be upheld if it "isnot meant to
merely bring about a private benefit, but instead is designed
to further a broader public purpose." Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); see also
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984)
(upholding a State's land condemnation procedures, that
served a legitimate public purpose (reduced concentration
of ownership of fees simple), though the ultimate purchasers
of the land were the existing tenants on the land); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp, 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)
(noting that a person's property may only be taken for another's benefit when there is a public purpose supporting
such an action). See generally Lawrence Berger, The Public Use

emy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S.CAL. L.
REV. 1393, 1524 (1991) (describing takings doctrine as
"chaos"); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles,Part L.A Critique of Current Takings Clause
Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299, 1303-04 (1989) (describing
Takings Clause doctrine as "in far worse shape than has generally been recognized"); Damon C. Watson, The Supreme
Court of the United States, 1993 Term - Dolan and the "Rough
Proportionality"Standard, 18 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'v 591, 602
(1995) (arguing that the Court needs to "refine its takings
doctrine"); Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 4-5

Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1978) (an-

alyzing the Taking Clause's public use requirement).
10 The just compensation requirement of the Takings
Clause "assures that the state will give to each person a fair
equivalent to what has been taken." RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN 5 (1985).
11
"In the ordinary meaning of the term, a 'taking' of
property is a physical takeover of a distinct entity, with an
accompanying transfer of the legal powers of enjoyment and
exclusion that are typically associated with rights of property." Schwartz, supra note 6, at 426-27 (quoting LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 592-93 (2d ed.

1988)).
See infra notes 21-31.
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment the government must also compensate private property owners
when it directly interferes with or substantially disturbs the
owner's use and enjoyment of the property. See Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
Thus, a taking occurs under the Fifth Amendment when the
government physically appropriates or physically invades private property for a public purpose, or so regulates the use of
private property that the regulation is deemed to be confiscatory. See infra notes 44-53. When a regulation becomes confiscatory or goes "too far" has been the subject of much debate in the Court and in scholarly works ever since Holmes
12

13

enunciated it. See, e.g., Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause:
A Modern Plotfor an Old ConstitutionalTale, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (1989) (describing takings doctrine as being as "convoluted as the plot of a pulp novel"); see also The Principle of
Equality in Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 109 HARv. L. REv.
1030 (1996) (describing the Takings Clause as "[t]he one
cloud on this otherwise clear constitutional horizon"); Jer-

(1987).
14
See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24,
26 (1984) (holding that the just compensation requirement
of the Takings Clause only requires the government to pay
the fair market value of the property taken at the time of the
taking); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (holding that just compensation must
be the "full and perfect equivalent for the property taken").
However, it has been noted that such holdings do not limit
the term just compensation to fair market value when such
compensation would be unfair. See Roger Clegg, Reclaiming
The Text of The Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531, 535 (1995);
(citing Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing
Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. REV. 579 (1995)); see also, United
States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 513 (1979) (noting that replacement cost may be the more appropriate measure of compensation where "an award of market value
would diverge so substantially from the indemnity principle
as to violate the Fifth Amendment."); United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 182-86 (1911) (holding that, when a portion of a party's property is taken, an owner is not justly compensated if he is unable to recover for the depreciation in
the value of the remaining property); Merrill Trust Co. v.
State, 417 A.2d 435, 437 (1980) (holding that just compensation was the market value of the portion taken, plus the diminution of the remaining property). For a general overview of
unjust compensation arguments see Epstein, supra note 6, at
182-215.
15
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978).
16 For a rather ambiguous definition of "common carrier" see 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1995). The United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit developed a two part test for
common carriage: (1) does the carrier provide service to all
potential users indifferently; and (2) is the system designed
to enable customers to transmit message of their own design
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tions, 1 7 these tests have not yet been applied in
the context of government-prescribed rates for
common carriers.' 8 The most recent confiscatory
takings case in the common carriage context only

requires that the regulation advance a legitimate
state interest and not limit the carrier to a confiscatory charge for its property. 19 Thus, common
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lined above. Challenges to forward-looking costing methodologies for the sale of unbundled network elements, first enunciated in the FCC's Local
Competition Report & Order21 and approved by several states, 22 may provide the courts with an opportunity to explain whether such divergence is
23
justified.

carriers, who devote their property for public use
(albeit for a handsome profit), could potentially
receive less Takings Clause protection than private property owners merely putting their property to private use. This is quite ironic given that
common carriers once received more Takings
20
Clause protections.
Given the lack of recent Supreme Court case
law reviewing takings claims in the common carrier context, one wonders whether the Supreme
Court would subject such public uses of private
property to a different standard from the one outand choosing? Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d
1475 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In addition, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 states that Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") providers shall be common carriers.
47 U.S.C. § 332(c). The Budget Reconciliation Act also provided a three part test for common carriage in the context of
"communication .

.

. radio or in interstate or foreign radio

transmission of energy." 107 Stat. at 395-96 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(d)(1). For a discussion of this test see E. Ashton Johnston, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services: The FCCAttempts to
Create Regulatoy Symmety, 2 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 1 (1994);
see also In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the

Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411 (1994).
17
See Epstein, supra note 6, at 168. The Supreme Court
has acknowledged the right of public utilities (such a tele-

phone companies) owned and operated by private investors
to assert their rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, even though their assets are employed for a
quasi-public purpose. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488
U.S. 299, 307 (1989). Robert Allen Epstein notes that, even
though a common carrier, such as a LEC, is required to "offer its service on a nondiscriminatory basis to all comers at an
appropriate price . . . the taking is for public use, even

though by a private party." Epstein, supra note 6, at 168-69.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 90-104 (discussion
of Takings Clause application in the common carriage context).

19 See Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 307 (citing Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S.
578, 597 (1896)). This test mirrored a test enunciated in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, a case considering a takings claim in
the land use context. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The court held
that a regulation "effects a taking... if [it] does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.., or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land." Id. at 260 (citing
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
See infra notes 90-91.
20
See Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at
21
11,754. The Commission has also proposed the adoption of
such a forward-looking cost methodology for determining eli-

A.

Traditional Takings Analysis-Takings
Limited to Physical Invasions of Property

Most early takings cases involved physical takings by the government of private property for
public use through the government's power of
eminent domain. 2 4 These cases consistently held
that government actions that do not physically appropriate private property for public use are not
justiciable under the Takings Clause. 25 However,
gibility for high-cost universal service assistance. See In re Federal-StateJoint Board on Universal Service, Report & Order,12
FCC Rcd. 8776 (1997).
22 See infra text accompanying notes 154-55.
23
As this paper will discuss, such disparate treatment
would be unjustified and inconsistent with past practices and
current realities.
24
Note, The Principle of Equality in Takings ClauseJurisprudence, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1031 (1996); citingMORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN

LAW, 1870 -

1960 145 (1992)."[M]ost of the early case law ... held that
compensation was required if government physically took
property, but not if it merely regulated the owner's use of
property." Treanor, supra note 6, at 792. Bernard Schwartz
notes that "[i]n the ordinary meaning of the term, a 'taking'
of property is 'a physical takeover of a distinct entity, with an
accompanying transfer of legal powers of enjoyment and exclusion that are typically associated with rights of property."
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 417 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 592-93 (2d ed. 1988). Further, in 1857, Theodore Sedgwick noted that "[i]t seems to
be settled that, to entitle the owner to protection under this
clause, the property must be actually taken in the physical
sense of the word." THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
RULES WHICH GovERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION

OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 519-20 (1857). Laurence Tribe notes that "[a]s early as 1798, Justice Chase, in
his memorable dictum in Calder v. Bull, had expressed constitutional law's undisputed condemnation of any law attempting to 'take from A and give it to B."' TRIBE, supra note 7, at
457. See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 1108 (1984).
The Supreme Court opined that "the takings clause clearly
requires government to pay Oust compensation] when it
physically appropriates land for some public use." Id.
25
See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897) (holding that damage caused by a dike, which altered the flow of
water to the petitioner's landing, was not compensable);
Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879) (holding that an
obstruction placed at the entrance of the petitioner's property during construction of a tunnel was not compensable).
"[A] cts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers,
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in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company the Supreme
Court ruled that when private property "is actually
invaded, [either directly or indirectly] so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking."26 Pumpelly expanded compensable takings

to include physical invasions, as well as physical
27
appropriations of private property.
The Court clarified Pumpelly in Mugler v. Kansas, where it held that police power regulations
meant to protect the health, safety, or morals of a
28
community were not compensable takings.
Mugler involved a prohibition statute directing all
liquor manufacturing facilities to close because
29
they were considered to be common nuisances.
The Court limited compensation to exercises of
the state's power of eminent domain, not its police power, which simply abates existing noxious
30
or injurious uses of property.
In the realm of physical takings, the Supreme
Court recognizes no distinctions among types of
private property owners. A private property
owner putting his property to public use receives
the same protections as a private property owner
putting his property to private use. In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme
Court found that a New York law requiring landlords to allow cable television companies to install
cable facilities in their buildings constituted a taking. 31 The Court determined that a taking had

occurred even though the facilities occupied only
11/2

cubic

feet.

32

and not directly encroaching upon private property ...

are

universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the
constitutional provision." Id. at 642.
26 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1872).
27 See id. at 181. It is critical to note that Pumpelly limited
its holding to physical invasions of private property, not restrictions on use. Id. The Pumpelly holding was limited to
instances "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or
by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness." Id.
28
123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
29 See id. at 662-63.
30
See id. at 668-69.
't 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
32
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16.
33 See id. at 426
34 The Court stated that an occupation is "permanent"
when it may last for the duration of the applicable legal regime. See id. at 439.
35
See id. at 427. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503

The Court found that regulations imposing permanent physical occupations of private property
require just compensation, 33 echoing the oft-pronounced rule that a permanent physical occupation of real property34 is a per se taking and automatically requires just compensation.

35

The

Court concluded that a "physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard
to the public interests that it may serve" 36 or the*
extent of the private property owner's economic
loss. 3 7 As noted above, this rule is applicable even

when the physical invasion is "minor" or "minute."

38

Recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari
to hear a Supreme Court of Oregon ruling that
held that an Oregon Open Network Architecture
("ONA") statute constituted a permanent physical
taking of ILEC property.39 The statute required
physical collocation 40 for Enhanced Service Provider ("ESP") equipment on LEC property. Citing Loretto, the Supreme Court found that "collocation can be characterized as a physical invasion
by the government" for three reasons. 41

The

Court stated that the statute: (1) "involves the
placement of a fixed structure on [the] land of
real property of an LEC," (2) "the ESP, not the
ILEC, .

.

. owns the equipment placed on the

LEC's property," and (3) "the rule requires an
LEC to provide collocation to an ESP that requests collocation." 42 Although this ruling does
not hold all physical and virtual collocation statIn FCCv. FloridaPower Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 250-54 (1987), the
Supreme Court held the Attachment Act, which provided

that cable operators leasing space on utility poles may seek
relief from alleged overcharging, did not compel a "permanent occupation" of the utility companies' property.

The

Court noted that "nothing in the Pole Attachments Act...
gives cable companies any right to occupy space on utility
poles, or prohibits utility companies from refusing to enter
into attachment agreements with cable operators." Id. at
251.
36 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
37 Id. at 435; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

See id. at 421, 436-37.
See GTE Northwest, Inc v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Oregon., 900 P.2d 495 (Or. 1995).
[
40 Collocation is " t]he ability of someone who is not the
38

39

local phone company to put their equipment in the phone
company's offices and jointly use the phone company's
equipment. That 'someone' might be .. . a competitor of

U.S. 519, 527 (1992) ("the Takings Clause requires compen-

the local phone company (i.e., another local phone com-

sation if the government authorizes a compelled physical invasion of property."). It is important to note that the Court
had previously refused to overturn a regulation that merely
regulated the terms of a voluntary commercial relationship.

41
GTE Northwest Inc., 900 P.2d at 503 (citing Loretto, 458
U.S. at 426) (emphasis added).
42
Id.

pany)." Id.
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utes violative of the Takings Clause, it clearly
reveals an application of the Loretto rule that finds
a taking in the context of a physical collocation
statute.

amounted to an uncompensated regulatory taking. 46 The Court reasoned that by preventing
Pennsylvania Coal from profitably mining coal in
the subsurface estate, the Kohler Act had the
practical effect of physically taking

B.

provided no benefit to Pennsylvania Coal.48 The

Following the early physical takings cases, which
held that police power regulations of property
were immune from Takings Clause claims, 4 3 the

Supreme Court expanded the protections that
the Takings Clause provides by holding that police power regulations that go "too far" also are
violative of the Takings Clause. 4 4 The case that
established the "too far" test was Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, which involved a Pennsylvania statute that denied a mining company's right to mine
under the private property of another when the
mining caused subsidence. 45 The Court ruled
that because the Kohler Act went "too far," it
43
The United States Supreme Court noted "[p]rior to
Justice Holmes' exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,

260 U.S. 393 (1922), it was . . . thought that the Takings

Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property...
or the functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the
owner's] possession,' Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S.
635, 642 (1879)." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). William Treanor notes that "antebellum courts . . . consistently held that state regulation

pursuant to the police power did not give rise to a compensation requirement, regardless of how dramatically that regulation affected the value of property." Treanor, supra note 6, at
792-93; see also FRED BOSSELMAN ET. AL., THE TAKING ISSUE: A
STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL AuWITHOUT

REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED

PAYING

COMPENSATION

TO

THE

OWNERS

47

The Court also noted that, while reciprocity of
advantage has been recognized as a justifica'tin
for many police power regulations, the Kohler Act

Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon-Extending
Protection of Private Property To
Regulations That Go 'Too Far'

THORITY TO

it.

LAND

106-10

(1973); see, e.g.,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(holding that a prohibition on brickyards did not constitute a
taking, even though it caused a 90% reduction in the value of
the claimant's property); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 66769 (1887) (holding that where a land-use regulation is enacted for the public morals, health or safety of the community, it will be upheld despite its effect on the value of the
property); Smith v. Corp. of Washington, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
135 (1858) (holding that the lowering of the grade of a road
adjoining a lot, which forced the homeowner to construct a
new entry, was not a compensable taking).
44
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. Justice Holmes
previously observed that a "restriction might be a valid exercise of ... police power, but if it render[s] the [property]
'wholly useless ...the police power would fail ...[requiring]

compensation and the power of eminent domain.' "
Treanor, supra note 6, at 801 n.102 (citing Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908)). Hinting
that the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal was a
long time in the making, Laura McKnight notes that "[a]s

reciprocity of advantage test requires that a regu-_
49
lation provide a private as well as public benefit.
Thus, the Court reversed its rule in Mugler v. Kansas by holding that the Kohler Act-an exercise of
the state's police powers-prescribed an uncompensated taking of property without just compen50
sation.
C.

1986 to Present-Toward Greater
Protection of Private Property and a More
Clarified Definition of Too Far
Pennsylvania Coal is often characterized as the

the scope of state police powers expanded even further in
response to changing social conditions, however, the Court
grew less convinced that every police power regulation was
immune from the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause." Laura
McKnight, Regulatory Takings: Sorting Out Supreme Court Standards After Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 41 U. KAN.
L. REv. 615, 619 (1993). Further, in a series of cases that
specifically dealt with "businesses clothed with a public interest," such as railroads and utilities, the Supreme Court "permitted regulation so long as it was not found to be confiscatory." Treanor, supra note 6, at 800; see, e.g., Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135, 155-56 (1921); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota,
236 U.S. 585, 596 (1915); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Cent. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1909); Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 695-96 (1899).
For an explanation of the term 'clothed with a public interest' see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A CriticalReexamination of the TakingsJurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1914 (1992).
45
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
46
See id. at 415-16. Whether or not the Act went too far
was determined by the extent that the regulation reduced
the value of the property. See id. at 413.
47
See id. at 414. William Michael Treanor opines that
"both Pennsylvania Coal and Rideout [a previous Holmes opinion] reflect a belief that property is properly viewed as value,
not physical possession, and that the Takings clause should
therefore protect more than physical possession." Treanor,
supra note 6, at 802.
48 See Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. The Court
noted that "an average reciprocity of advantage ... has been
recognized as the justification of various laws." Id. Holmes
noted that while the Kohler Act may have provided a public
benefit, it provided no reciprocal private benefit. See id. at
415-16.
49 See id.
50
See id. at 414-16.
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most important modern takings law decision. 51
However, while it made clear that the Takings
Clause protects private property owners from exercises of police power that "go too far," 52 Pennsylvania Coal and subsequent rulings did little to
53
clarify the meaning of "too far."

During the period following Pennsylvania Coal,
the Supreme Court, in its application of the "too
far" test, upheld far-reaching police power regulations. 54 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, the Supreme Court identified a threepart "ad hoc" balancing test to determine when
regulation goes "too far." This three-part balanc51 See Treanor, supra note 6,at 798. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, the Court noted that Pennsylvania Coal "has for 65 years been the foundation of our
'regulatory takings' jurisprudence." Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Renquist, C.J. dissenting); see also Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT.REV. 1, 12 (1987) (noting
that "Pennsylvania Coal has long been regarded as perhaps
the single most important decision in the takings [jurisprudence].); BRUCE A. AcKRMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 156 (1977) (calling Pennsylvania Coal "both
the most important and most mysterious writing in takings
law.").
52 "Under Pennsylvania Coal Co., "there is a line beyond
which a regulation may not go without violating the Takings
Clause." Schwartz, supra note 6, at 426.
53
Laura McKnight notes that "Pennsylvania

Coal ... blurred what had been a clear line between the po-

lice powers and eminent domain in the Court's land use decisions throughout the previous century." McKnight, supra
note 44, at 621. Even in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, Justice
Holmes conceded that whether a regulation "goes too far" is
.a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
The Supreme Court recently noted that "our decision in
[Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon] offered little insight into when,
and under what circumstances, a given regulation would be
seen as going 'too far' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992). There is much debate among legal scholars as to when a regulation adopted pursuant to police powers goes too far. For example, Bernard Schwartz notes that
"the regulation must destroy the essential rights of the property owner before the Holmes 'diminution in value' theory
becomes applicable." Schwartz, supra note 6, at 427. But,
there is little agreement as to when such 'essential rights of
property' are in fact destroyed. For example, some would argue that "any diminution in the Blackstone trilogy of rights is
a 'taking' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
at 418 (citing RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 23 (1985)). Justice
Scalia has argued that "the Takings clause comes into play
whenever government regulation interferes with the rights of
the property owner." Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1,
15 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting). On the other extreme, Justice Stevens has argued that "[u]nlike physical invasions,
which are relatively rare and easily identifiable without making any economic analysis, regulatory programs constantly affect property values in countless ways, and only the most ex-

ing test included: "[t] he economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant, . . . the extent to

which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed-expectations

.

.

. [and] the

character of the governmental action. '5 5 Any single factor may determine whether there is or is
not a taking. 5 6 Under this test the Supreme Court
upheld far-reaching land use regulations, such as
a statute that essentially had the same effect as the
Kohler Act overturned by Pennsylvania Coal.57 In
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc., the Court used the
same reciprocity of advantage test 58 that Holmes

treme regulations can constitute takings." First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 329 (1987) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
54 See Daniel A. Crane, A Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings
After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CHi. L. REV. 199, 200 (1996)
("[T]he Court's [rulings]traditionally ... [tilted] heavily in
favor of the regulatory state."); see, e.g., Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 506 (1987) (upholding a mining restriction similar to that which existed in the
Kohler Act, which was struck down in Pennsylvania Coal);
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)
(upholding a requirement that a shopping center owner allow petitioners to gather signatures on his property); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978)
(upholding the City of New York's historic landmarks zoning
regulation, which placed height limits on certain buildings,
as a legitimate exercise of police power); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinance restricting commercial development despite a
75% diminution in property value). In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Supreme Court noted that the
petitioners would have an uphill struggle in invalidating the
zoning ordinance, the Court noted that "[a] 'taking' may
[be] more readily found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government,
see, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good." Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
55 Id.
56 See id. See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1005 (1984) (holding that the absence of investmentbacked expectation alone was "so overwhelming .. .that it

disposes of the taking question.").
57 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 474. Unlike
the Kohler Act, which merely weighed the private interests of
surface owners against the private interests of subsurface
owners, the Subsidence Act included a finding that "important public interests are served by enforcing a policy that is
designed to minimize subsidence." Id. at 485.
58 The reciprocity of advantage test requires that police
power regulations provide both public and private benefits.
See supra note 51-52. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., the
Court noted that the law will more likely be upheld if it "is
not meant to merely bring about a private benefit, but instead is designed to further a broader public purpose." Jan G.
Laitos, The Takings Clause in America's Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 281, 296 (1993) (citing Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)). Fur-
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used in Pennsylvania Coal.59 However, the Court
held that the Subsidence Act provided for substantial private benefits-the right to profitably
remove ninety-eight percent of the subsurface estate-in addition to the public benefit of less subsidence. 60 While clarifying the "too far" test, these
rulings confirmed the Court's deference to the
state's power to regulate the use of private property.
This judicial deference to the state's police
power began to erode in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 6 1 in which the Supreme Court held that even
when regulations "take" property temporarily, the
government must pay compensation to the landowner equal to the value of the property for the
62
period of the taking.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n the Court
further increased scrutiny of such police power
regulations 63 by striking down a California Coastal
Commission decision that lacked an "essential
65
nexus" 64 to the justification for the prohibition.

The Court noted that the traditional test of police
power regulations is whether they "substantially

ther, "[g]overnment actions are more justifiable, despite
their impact on private property rights, if they arise from a
public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Id. at 296-97.
59
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1992), (citing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S.
531 (1913) (upholding a statute requiring adjacent coal mining operations to leave a pillar of coal between them). In
Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes went on to note that the
Kohler Act did not result in a reciprocity of advantage for the
coal company since it received nothing in return for the deprivation of its subsurface mining rights. See id. Laura McKnight notes that Justice Holmes developed the reciprocity
of advantage test shortly before Pennsylvania Coal in Jackman
v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922). See McKnight, supra
note 44, at 620 n.50.
60
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 481-502.
In many ways the majority opinion in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n. simply restated Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania
Coal. See Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 416-22 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis, echoing his Pennsylvania
Coal dissent, argued that the Kohler Act did not violate the
Takings Clause because it was "merely the prohibition of a
noxious use." Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Brandeis, restating the rule in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887), noted that "[a] restriction upon use does not become inappropriate as a means, merely because it deprives
the owner of the only use to which the property can then be
profitably put," especially when the statute attacked merely
regulates that which constitutes a public nuisance. Id. at 418.
"Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal... became known as
the noxious use exception to the Takings Clause." See McKnight, supra note 44, at 621. One scholar has argued that
the Court's use of the noxious use exception as part of the
reciprocity of advantage balancing test in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. appeared to indicate that the Court was beginning
to increase Fifth Amendment scrutiny. See Raymond Coletta,

Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New
Theory of Taking Jurisprudence,40 Am. U. L. REv. 297, 335-36
(1990). The Court seemed to indicate that even when regulating noxious uses, the state must now show a resulting public benefit. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 49192. Previously regulation of a noxious was a per se valid public purpose. See Coletta, 40 AM. U.L. REv. at 321 n.158.
61
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
62
See id. at 317-18, 322. The Court further held that
"[I]nvalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance
after this period of time, though converting the taking into a
'temporary' one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause." Id. at 319.
63
483 U.S. 825.
64
Id. at 837.
65
See id. In Nollan, the Supreme Court held that the California Coastal Commission could not condition the grant of
a permit for constructing a beachfront bungalow in Ventura,
California on a concession from the property owners, that
they would permit the public access to an easement
"bounded by the mean high tide line on one side, and their
seawall on the other." Id. at 828. See id. The stated purpose
of the prohibition was to protect the public's view of the
beach, enable the public to access the beach, and reduce
congestion at the public beaches. See id. at 835.
66
Id. at 834; citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980). In Notlan, the Court conceded that the regulations
advanced legitimate state interests and did not deny Nollan
economically viable use of his land. 483 U.S. at 835-36.
67
See id. at 837.
68
505 U.S. at 1003 (1992). The State of South Carolina
passed the Beachfront Management Act which prevented Lucas from erecting any permanent structures on his land. See
id.
69
See id. at 1014, 1030-31.

advance ...

legitimate state interests," and do not

"den [y] an owner economically viable use of his
land."66 In Nollan, the Court added the condition
that there be an essential nexus between the public purpose of the regulation and the restriction
67
on the private property.
While nor furthering heightening of Takings
Clause scrutiny, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council further clarified its scope. 68 The Court
held that the state can justify a complete regulatory taking of private property without compensation only if the contemplated use was already prohibited either by common law or nuisance
principles or by statute when the property owner
originally purchased its property. 69 In such a scenario, the prohibited use would not be a justified,
investment-backed expectation at the time of
purchase.7 0

The Court further held that if the

regulation "denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land" the regulation is a per se

70

See id.
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taking and must be compensated. 71 The Court
concluded that the Beachfront Management Act
was an unconstitutional per se taking of Lucas'
property without just compensation because it denied Lucas all the economically viable uses of his
property, and the contemplated use was not prohibited by common law or nuisance principles or
72
by a statute at the time of purchase.
Two years later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the
Supreme Court further increased Takings Clause
scrutiny by invalidating a building permit that required Dolan, the owner of a hardware store, to
dedicate a portion of land lying within a creek's
flood plain for use as a public green way and an
additional fifteen foot strip of land adjacent to the3
7
flood plain for use as a pedestrian/bicycle path.
The Court concluded that the City of Tigard had
not shown that the required dedication was reasonably related to the impact of the proposed development.7 4 Though there was an essential
nexus between the purpose of the permit and the
required dedication, 75 the Court ruled that the
City had not shown that the dedication was
roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development. 76 Thus, in addition to the essential nexus test, the Court demanded the dedication to be roughly proportional to the impact of
77
the development.
Dolan, Lucas and Nollan establish a higher de-

gree of Takings Clause scrutiny than in previous
Supreme Court cases. Physical invasions of property as well as any denial of economically viable
use, absent the exceptions stated above, are now
per se takings. If the regulation is not a per se
taking, there must now be an essential nexus between the public purpose of the regulation and
the restriction on use. Moreover, the restriction
or required dedication must be roughly proportional to the impact of the regulated activity.
Thus, Nollan and Dolan hold that a property
owner need not show that the regulation has denied all economically viable use of the property to
seek relief under the Takings Clause.

Id. at 1015. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen no pro71
ductive or economically beneficial use of [property] is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that
the legislature is simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of

Ry. Co., although the Supreme Court recognized the state's
police power to set just and reasonable rates, it held "[I]f
rates are fixed at an insufficient amount within the meaning
of that term as given by the courts, the law would be invalid,
as amounting to the taking of the property of the company
without due process of law." Id. Contrast Chicago Burlington
& Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 562 (1906) (holding that a railroad forced to tear down and rebuild a bridge
for reasons of public safety was not entitled to compensation); New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197
U.S. 453 (1905) (holding that no compensation was required
when a gas company was ordered to change the location of
underground pipes to accommodate a drainage system).
79
In Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Welman, the
Supreme Court held that "[tihe legislature has power to fix
rates, and the extent of judicial interference is protection
against unreasonable rates." 143 U.S. at 344. The Supreme
Court later held that rates imposed by legislatures upon common carriers must not conflict with "every constitution [al]
guarantee against the taking of private property for public
purposes without just compensation." Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. at 399; see also St. Louis & San
Francisco Ry. Co., 156 U.S. at 657-58 (When "legislation es-

economic life '

. .

. in a manner that secures an average reci-

procity of advantage' to everyone concerned." Id. at 1017-18.
See id. at 1029-32. In Lucas the Court did not need to
72
indulge in essential nexus analysis because it concluded at
the outset that the Act had forced Lucas to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of his property. See infra note 75.
73
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
74
See id. at 386-87.
75
See id. at 387-90. Dedication of the green way would
reduce flooding and dedication of the bicycle/foot path
would reduce traffic congestion. See id.
See id. at 390-96. The government would have to show
76
that the extent of the dedication is roughly proportional to
the quantifiable needs of the municipality. See id. In the instant case, the City of Tigard had not quantified how much
traffic would be offset by the bicycle/foot path. Id. at 395.
The Court noted that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation
is required." Id.
77
See id. at 391.
78
See Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S.
684, 687 (1899) (citing Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344 (1892); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894); St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 657 (1895); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 523 (1898)). In Lake Shore &Michigan S.

D.

'Too Far' Analysis in the Common Carriage
Context

1. Confiscatory Takings-Regulations that Deny All
Beneficial Uses of Property
Takings Clause protection of "businesses
clothed with a public interest" from confiscatory
police power regulations pre-dates Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon by at least thirty years. 78 In these
early cases, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
power to regulate rates of common carriers must
have limits. 7 9 Thus, a quid pro quo of the legisla-

tures' right to regulate the rates charged by these

tablishing .

.

. rates .

.

. is so unreasonable as to practically

destroy the value of property of companies engaged in the
carr[y] business ...

such acts of legislation . . . depriv[e] the

companies of their property without due process of law; and
...depriv[e] them of equal protection [under] the laws.").
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private entities was judicial oversight. Despite this
early trail-blazing, and although the Supreme
Court has recognized the unique nature of ratemaking,8 0 throughout this century it has consistently applied similar judicial scrutiny to regulations that prescribe physical invasions of common

that had the effect of prohibiting an electric utility from recovering prudent and reasonable costs
of aborted plant construction either by including
these costs in its rate base or by amortizing

carrier property or impose rates that go too far. 81
However, the recent Supreme Court opinions
that have brought about so much change in Takings Clause jurisprudence in the land use context
have not addressed regulation of common carriers. Thus, depending on the way the Supreme
Court interprets its most recent holdings, common carriers, which (arguably) devote their property to public use could potentially receive less
Takings Clause protection than land owners utilizing their property for purely private gain.
In FederalPower Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
perhaps the most important regulatory takings
clause case in this century, the United States
Supreme Court upheld an Order issued by the
Federal Power Commission that required Hope
Natural Gas to substantially reduce its wholesale
gas rates.82 The Federal Power Commission used
an embedded costing methodology that resulted
in a plant valuation only half as large as the company's own valuation.8 3 Thus, Hope Natural Gas
was able to recover only half the costs it wished to
include in its interstate wholesale rates.8 4 Despite
these disallowances, the Court upheld the pricing
methodology because it enabled the gas company
as a whole to operate successfully, although with
8 5
only a "meager return."

. . . [certain] capital investments that are not
,used and useful in service to the public."' 8 7 The

In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, the United
States Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law
80
See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307
(1989).
81 See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era:
Lessonsfrom the Controversy Over Railroadand Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 215-23 (1984); MORTONJ. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,1870-1960: THE CRI-

160-64 (1992).
Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S.
591 (1943).
SIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
82

83

See id. at 596-98.

See id.
Id. at 605. Compare this rule with the test developed
in Agins v. City of Tiburon. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). That
rule stated that a regulation does not effect a taking if it does
not deny economically viable use of private property and substantially advances legitimate state interests. It would appear
that the legitimate state interest in Hope Natural Gas was just
and reasonable wholesale gas rates (although the Court did
not explicitly address this prong of the test).
86 Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 301-02.
84
85

them. 86 The Court held "that utility regulation
does not 'take' property [if it] simply ... disallows

Court reasoned that when applying the Takings
Clause to government rate setting for public utilities, the Takings Clause simply requires that the
government-prescribed rates not be "so 'unjust' as
to be confiscatory.""" Nine years earlier, a similar
test was used in Agins v. City of Tiburon, in which
the Court considered a regulatory Takings Clause
claim in the land use context.8 9 The Court concluded that if the State prescribes a rate that does
not provide the common carrier with adequate
compensation, 9 °1 the rate will violate the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9 1
Because Duquesne Light Co. found that the regulated utility was provided sufficient compensation
to operate profitably under a test similar to the
Agins v. City of Tiburon two-part test, no Takings
Clause violation existed. 9 2 Thus, rulings such as
Duquesne and Hope Natural Gas, which were unaffected by the additional tests developed in Nollan,
Lucas, and Dolan,9 3 are illustrative of a deferential
period in the Supreme Court's takings clause jurisprudence featuring cases such as Pennsylvania
Coal Co. and DeBenedictis.94 It is unclear whether
the Supreme Court will subject rate making to the
essential nexus and rough proportionality tests
developed in these latter cases if a government
prescribed rate is anything short of confiscatory.
87

Id at 301-02.

88 Id. at 307 (citing Covington & Lexington Turnpike
Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896)). The Court
further stated that "[a]lI that is protected against, in a constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be
higher than a confiscatory level." Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S.
at 308 (citing FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1974)).
89 See supra text accompanying notes 19, 99-100, 115-17,
148. In Duquesne, the Court found that the rate afforded sufficient compensation. Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 311-12.
90
See infra text accompanying notes 156-163 for a detailed discussion of just compensation for common carriers.
91 See Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 308.
92

See id.

See supra text accompanying notes 70-89. As a point of
clarification, it is worth noting that the Nollan ruling occurred later in 1989 than the Duquesne ruling, which oc93

curred on January 11, 1989.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 57-68.
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2. In Rate Making Unjust Results, Not
Methodologies, Can Constitute Takings
Although several recent articles have bantered
back and forth about the constitutionality of one
costing methodology or the other, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the methodology
itself is largely irrelevant to whether the Takings
Clause has been violated. 95 In general, the Court
has assumed a position of neutrality as to whether
one methodology or the other is constitutionally
sound. 96 In Hope Natural Gas, the United States
Supreme Court held that under a statutory standard of 'just and reasonable it is the result
reached [and] not the method employed [that] is
controlling. ' 9 7 In other words, "it is not the the-

ory, but the impact of the rate order that
*counts."9 8 Following Hope Natural Gas, the Court

in Duquesne explained that a rate may not be challenged by attacking the methodology used to produce it.99 As a result, the embedded or prudent
investment costing methodology upheld in Hope
Natural Gas is no more susceptible to a Takings
Clause challenge than the forward-looking or "fair
95
Of course, the methodology may be highly relevant in
light of the law under which it is adopted. For example, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that under the 1996 Act, a forward-looking UNE
costing methodology was more appropriate. See GTE South
Inc. v. Morrison 6 F. Supp. 2d 517, 529 (E.D. Va. 1998)
("252(d) (1)(A) is best read as not allowing historical costs").
96 See Baumol & Merrill, supra note 1, at 1043 ("the Constitution is neutral as between different rate setting methods").
97
Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
98 Id. at 602.
99 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barash, 488 U.S. 299, 314
(1989). The Court reasoned "[t]he designation of a single
theory of ratemaking as a constitutional requirement would
unnecessarily foreclose alternatives which could benefit both
consumers and investors." Id. at 316.
100 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898); see also MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1117 (7th
Cir. 1983) ("long-run incremental cost has been approved as
an economically relevant measure of average total cost").
101 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States 148
U.S. 312, 326 (1893); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,
373 (1943).
See Miller, 317 U.S. at 374. Robert Allen Epstein notes
102
that "the value of the property, not its cost, determines the
amount of compensation to be paid." Epstein, supra note 6,
at 182. In other words, though a private property owner may
have invested a significant amount in its property, it is only
entitled to recovering the market value of that property, even
if this means that the property owner will not recover all of its
investment. See id. Of course, this is conditioned by the requirement that the compensation be just to the property
owner. See Clegg, supra note 14, at 535.

value" costing methodology upheld in Smyth v.
Ames, which "mimics the operation of the competitive market." 0 0 Although just compensation has
most often meant "the full and perfect equivalent
fair market value in money of the property
taken," 10 1 or fair market value, 10 2 the Court does
not limit itself to forward-looking methodologies
when doing so provides insufficient compensation.1 03 Ultimately, there is not only one "constitutionally acceptable method of fixing utility
10 4
rates."
An important practical reason for not choosing
one methodology over another is that it would undoubtedly lead to a form of economic trickery.
Such trickery has already been displayed by some
parties to the UNE pricing debate. For example,
in one recently litigated state interconnection arbitration proceeding, both the ILEC, GTE South,
Inc., and the CLEC, Cox Fibernet Commercial
Services, Inc., proposed very different "forwardlooking" UNE costing methodologies. It should
be no surprise that GTE's proposal included more
10 5
costs than Cox's proposal.

103 See Clegg, supra note 14, at 535. See also Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46
S.C. L. REv. 579 (1995); Monongahela Navigation Co, 148 U.S.
at 325-329; United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 at 182-86
(1911). The Court is hesitant to award amounts other than
market value (e.g., replacement cost), especially when doing
so may result in a windfall. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 1309-10 (1984); Epstein, supra note 6, at 183-84;
Timothy Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market
Value: The Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379,
393 (1983).
104 Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 310 (citing Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 605.). Since the Supreme Court's
landmark Hope Natural Gas decision, it has upheld numerous
pricing methodologies. See, e.g., Lord Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 84 F. Supp. 748, 755-56 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (holding that
just compensation is not intended to permit recovery of monopoly rents); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,
339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) (holding that "[w]he[re] market
value [is] ...difficult to find, other standards [may be appropriate]."); Metro Transp. Auth. v. ICC, 792 F.2d 287, 297 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986) (holding that
incremental cost based pricing is just compensation); Illinois
Bell Telephone v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that a discounted cash flow methodology provides for just
compensation). In Hope Natural Gas, the Court noted that
the rate should also be "commensurate with returns on investments [of] other enterprises having corresponding risks."
320 U.S. at 603; Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 988 F.2d at 1260.
105 See GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517,
528 (E.D. Va. 1998). GTE advocated the M-ECPR method,
which is based on the sum of the ILEC's TELRICs plus its
opportunity costs, while Cox advocated a pure TELRIC methodology. Although characterized as a forward-looking methodology, the former methodology would permit GTE to re-
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In Hope Natural Gas the Court further noted
that the total effect of the rate order on the entity
regulated must deny it just compensation.1 0 6
Such a burden of proof is difficult for a challenger to overcome. 10

7

In short, no matter which

methodology is utilized, the regulated entity must
be compensated so that it can operate at a profit,
however small.
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(1) construct and interconnect its own facilities;1 12 (2) purchase unbundled elements; 113 or
(3) resell existing service offerings. 114 Pursuant to
Sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act, on August
8, 1996, the FCC released the Local Competition Report and Order,115 which prescribes a methodology
by which new entrants1 16 in the local exchange
marketplace will be charged for the UNEs

1

7

of

system."" 8

III.

THE PRICING OF UNBUNDLED
NETWORK ELEMENTS-STRIKING A
BALANCE BETWEEN THE NEED FOR
COMPETITION AND THE PRIVATE
PROPERTY INTERESTS OF INCUMBENT
LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS

Three years after passage of the 1996 Act, 10 8 opportunities continue to emerge for new entrants
to penetrate the largely monopolized local telecommunications marketplace,1 0 9 and Bell Operating Company entry into long-distance telephone
service appears to be imminent.I1 0 Sections 251
and 252 of the 1996 Act specifically provides a
prospective entrant with three methods of entry
into the local marketplace."' A new entrant may
cover historical (embedded) costs.
106
Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602.
107
See id.
108 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56.
109 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-253.
110 Id. at § 271-272. The RBOCs, after several attempts,
been unsuccessful in obtaining approval from the FCC for
entry into in-region long-distance.
"I
See Local Competition Report & Order, 61 Fed. Reg.
45,479 (1996).
112
See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (2).
113
See infra note 34.
''4
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4). It is interesting to note
that resale enabled MCI to enter the long-distance marketplace. DANIEL L. BRENNER, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMON
CARRIERS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRy 11 (1996).
115
See Local Competition Report & Order, 61 Fed. Reg.
45,476 (1996).
116
New entrants are prospective providers of local exchange services in the local exchange marketplace, such as
long-distance providers, cable companies and competitive access providers. MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw 849 (1992).
117
Unbundled elements are defined as the components
that make up the Local Exchange Carrier's network. FCC's
Initial Decisions in FCC Docket No. 96-98, 2 TELECOMM. ACT
INFO. SERV. (BRP) 9-12 (Sept. 1996). This aggregation of
components is the means by which local origination and termination of wireline telephony occurs. See id. at 9. Unbundied elements include all the infrastructure that extends
from the end user to the IXC's point of presence (where the
IXC's network begins) and back to the end user. See id. at 10.
Local transmission of wireline telephony does not require

the ILEC's
In other words, the FCC
prescribed a methodology by which Regional Bell
Operating Companies (RBOCs) and other ILECs
must charge new entrants, such as Competitive
Access Providers (CAPs), Interexchange Carriers
(IXCs), and Cable Television Companies, to lease
specific elements of their network, so that these
new entrants may compete with them in the local
exchange marketplace.
In the Local Competition Report and Order, the
FCC adopted the Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost methodology for the pricing of unbundled elements.I" TELRIC is a forward-looking pricing methodology that aims to capture the
total long run incremental cost of a specific unbundled element.1 20 TELRIC is meant to approximate what it would cost a competitive or efficient
any additional components, other than the network components, for local transmission. See BRENNER, supra note 114, at
35. Once one possesses these components one may provide
local service, without any reliance on any other provider's infrastructure.
118

61 Fed. Reg. at 45,543.
See id. at 45,483.
120
See id. at 45,543. The FCC's TELRIC or any long-run
incremental costing methodology looks at the economically
efficient, forward-looking long-run incremental cost of producing a given unbundled element. See id. A long-run incremental or marginal cost model attempts to identify all of the
costs associated with producing a next unit of output, as opposed to a short-run incremental or marginal cost methodology, which merely isolates the cost today of increasing output. See id. In other words, a long-run incremental cost
methodology looks at what it would cost an efficient ILEC,
on a per unit basis, to produce the next unit of output (i.e.,
the unbundled element). See id. at 45,546. Most importantly,
perhaps, the FCC's TELRIC methodology includes forwardlooking assumptions regarding the technologies that will be
used in producing that next unit of output. See id. It also
includes assumptions regarding how efficiently this modern
network will be operated-so-called "fill'factors". Id. Any
methodology will have different assumptions built into it. See
id. The FCC's assumptions are meant to ensure that ILECs
charge competitive prices for unbundled network elements,
which theoretically will encourage new entrants into the marketplace. See id. These forward-looking assumptions, which
may not necessarily reflect how an ILEC or a new entrant
would in fact produce that next unit of output, have been the
subject of perhaps the most intense debate. See id. Finally,
TELRIC excludes the costs of providing the service to the
end user. See id. at 45,544. The Report and Order notes that
119
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local exchange carrier to produce UNEs using today's most efficient technologies. 12' An embedded cost methodology, on the other hand, looks
at the actual costs incurred in building a network
using yesterday's technologies, and in the absence
of any threat of competition. 22 Ultimately, the
FCC's TELRIC model attempts to simulate what it
would cost an existing or prospective local service
provider to develop the infrastructure required to
provide each unbundled element of local service
and limits compensation to those costs plus a reasonable profit.1 23 By not limiting compensation
to forward-looking costs, an embedded cost methodology would theoretically ensure that the ILEC
is always made whole (in essence, is able to recover all of its costs). Some parties argue that because the TELRIC or any forward-looking cost
methodology includes assumptions about how
much it should cost an ILEC to provide an unbundled element, it inevitably risks inadequately compensating ILECs, who may in fact incur far greater
costs. 1 24 On the other hand, an embedded cost-

ing methodology, such as that reviewed in Duquesne Light Co., that only compensates for "prudent investment" could also potentially
Total Service Long-Run Incremental Cost or TSLRIC, a pricing methodology advocated by some parties, is a forwardlooking pricing methodology that would include such costs.
See id. Under TELRIC, these service costs would be presumably assumed by the purchaser of the unbundled element in
providing service to the end user. See id. Thus, these would
be costs avoided by the ILEC in selling the unbundled element to the new entrant and should not be included in the
price of the unbundled element. See id.
121
See id. at 45,544.
122
"Embedded or accounting costs are costs that firms
incurred in the past for providing a good or service and are
recorded as past operating expenses and depreciation." Id. at
45,544.
123
See id. at 45,543.
124
The FCC noted that "[d]ue to changes in input
prices and technologies, incremental costs may differ from
embedded costs of that same increment." Id. at 45,544.
125
Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 309. Of course, this
assumes that some portion of ILEC investment has not been
prudent.
126
See Local Competition Report & Order,at 45,479.
127
See id. at 45,481.
128
See id. at 45,544.
129
SeeJoint Motion of GTE Corporation and the Southern New England Telephone Company for Stay Pending Judicial Review in CC Dkt No. 96-98 (Aug. 28, 1996); and Request for a Stay Pending Judicial Review (US West), CC Dkt.
No. 96-98 (Sept. 6, 1996). Contrast, e.g., Opposition of AT&T
Corp. To the Joint Motion of GTE Corporation and the
Southern New England Telephone Company for Stay Pending Judicial Review in CC Dkt. No. 96-98 (Sept. 4, 1996); Opposition to the Joint Motion of GTE Corporation and the
Southern New England Telephone Company for Stay Pend-

inadequately compensate ILECs.125
Given the 1996 Act's stated intent to promote
competition in all sectors of telecommunications, 12 6 the FCC concluded in the Local Competition Report and Order that any methodology
adopted for pricing unbundled network elements
should attempt to simulate the cost of these unbundled elements in a competitive and efficient
27

marketplace.

The FCC reasoned that a

TELRIC methodology will most effectively accomplish this goal, because it best replicates the conditions of a competitive marketplace and prevents
ILECs from engaging in anti-competitive behavior.

128

29
Several parties filed Petitions with the FCC'
and with the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit 30 challenging the FCC's adoption of the TELRIC methodology. ILECs have
also challenged several state regulators for adopt-

ing TELRIC.'

3

1

Opponents of the TELRIC meth-

odology argue that it constitutes a physical taking
because the Local Competition Report and Orderprescribed the physical occupation of ILEC property
without just compensation.

3

2

These parties also

argue that because a forward-looking costing
ing Judicial Review (Teleport Communications Group) in
CC Dkt. No. 96-98 (Sept. 4, 1996); Opposition of the United
States Department ofJustice to the Joint Motion of GTE Corporation and the Southern New England Telephone Company for a Stay PendingJudicial Review in CC Dkt. No. 96-98
(Sept. 4, 1996).
130 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418 (8" Cir. 1996),
rev'd, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., _ U.S. _,

1999 WL

24568 (Jan. 25, 1999).
131
See, e.g., GTE, Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517
(E.D. Va. 1998); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. US West
Communications, Inc., No. C97-1508R, slip op. (W.D. Wash.
1998); US West Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc., No. C97-1320R, slip op.
(W.D. Wash. 1998).
132
See Joint Motion of GTE Corporationand the Southern New
England Telephone Company, supra note 129, at 16. These parties argue that the Report and Orderinvolves a physical invasion because another section of the 1996 Act, Section
251 (c) (6), requires that ILECs permit the physical or virtual
collocation of the equipment of prospective competitors that
is necessary for access to the ILECs' unbundled elements. 47
U.S.C. § 251 (c) (6). Opponents of the ILECs' argument note
that 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (6) also permits the virtual collocation
of "equipment necessary for ... access to unbundled network
elements .

.

. if the local exchange carrier demonstrates to

the State commission that physical collocation is not practical
for technical reasons or because of space limitations." Id.
This, they argue, is not a physical invasion of ILEC property,
because under virtual collocation the interconnecting carrier's equipment is not actually physically located on the
ILEC's property. See Teleport Communications Group Opposition,
supra note 129, at 6.
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methodology does not permit them to recover
their actual or embedded 'costs,' and thus, is not
'just' and 'reasonable,' it violates Sections
251(c) (2) and (3), and 252(d) (1) (A) of the 1996
Act and constitutes a taking.133 These opponents
reason that forward-looking costing methodologies do not adequately compensate them for the
cost of providing unbundled network elements, so
that they are unable to recover their embedded or
1
actual costs.

34

Petitions for Stay of the Local Competition Report
and Order were denied by the FCC on September
17, 1996.135 On October 15, 1996, the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the Local
Competition Report and Order pending its review of
the takings claim.136 On July 17, 1997, the Eighth
Circuit issued its long-awaited decision on this
challenge, overturning the FCC's imposition of
the TELRIC methodology largely on jurisdictional
grounds, and left open the question of whether a
13 7
TELRIC methodology could result in a taking.
On January 25, 1999, the United States Supreme
Court issued its long-awaited decision largely reinstating the FCC's local competition rules.'13

In

light of the largely jurisdictional nature of the appeal, the Supreme Court did not address the issue
of whether the FCC's UNE costing rules constitute a taking. Meanwhile, at least thirty-five states
have independently approved a TELRIC unbun133
See Joint Motion of GTE Corporationand the Southern New
England Telephone Company, supra note 129, at 12, 14, 17. Op-

ponents argue that Section 251 (d) (I) (1) requires a costing
methodology that allows them to recover all prudently incurred embedded (actual) costs, which they allege a long run
incremental costing methodology does not permit. See Joint
Motion of GTE Corporation and the Southern New England Telephone Company, supra note 129, at 17.
134 Joint Motion of G7
Corporation and the Southern New
England Telephone Company, supra note 129, at 12-13.
135 See Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at
11,754, para. 32 (1996).
136 Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 427 ( 8 "' Cir.
1996).
137
See Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 816 (8"' Cir.
1997). The court held that the Act demanded that states, not
the FCC, develop methodologies for the pricing of unbundied network elements. See id. Noting that it had already vacated the unbundling rules on jurisdictional grounds, the
court held that "because the petitioners have not demonstrated that they have participated in ...

state arbitration pro-

ceedings and have been denied just compensation, we find
that their takings claim is not ripe for review." Id. at 818. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. See MCI Telecommunications Corp., et al. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879
(1998).
138
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., _ U.S. _, 1999 WL
24568 (Jan. 25, 1999), reversing, Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 120
F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997).
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died elements pricing methodology. 139 Of these

states, at least fifteen are being sued for approving
forward-looking cost incremental pricing for unbundled network elements. 140

Moreover, ILECs

continue to contend that TELRIC does not provide them with adequate compensation. 1

41

Thus

far, United States District Courts have uniformly
held that, absent permanent rates, a TELRIC
UNE claim is not ripe for review.'

IV.

42

THE FCC ARGUES THAT THE ACT
DOES NOT PRESCRIBE A PHYSICAL
TAKING AND TELRIC WILL PROVIDE
ILECS WITH JUST COMPENSATION

In the Local Competition Report and Order, the
FCC argued that the 1996 Act does not prescribe
a physical invasion of ILEC property. 43 But, even
if it does, the FCC reasoned that adopting the
TELRIC pricing methodology provides for just
compensation, and thus, is not confiscatory. 14 4 .
In defending its pricing methodology against
claims that it constitutes a regulatory taking, the
FCC correctly argued that, in determining
whether a rate is confiscatory, the Supreme Court
examines whether the rate itself is just and reasonable, not the methodology used to arrive at the
rate. 1 45 The FCC asserted that any claims of con139
FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, speech before National Associations of Regulatory Utility Commissioner Communications Committee (Feb. 25, 1997); FCC Chairman
Reed E. Hundt, speech before The Freedom Forum and Georgetown University (Feb. 7, 1997). For a sample listing of
states that have approved forward-looking economic cost
studies, see In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report & Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, para. 247 n.651 (rel.
May 8, 1997).
140
See FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, speech before National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Communications Committee (Feb. 25, 1997).
141
See, e.g., US West Communications, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 991 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (D. Utah
1998); US West Communications Inc. v. MFS Intelenet Inc.,
No. C97-222WD slip op. (W.D. Wash. 1998).
142
See US West Communications, Inc. v. AT&T: Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc, No. C97-1320R, slip
op. at 25 (W.D. Wash. 1998); GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, 6
F. Supp. 2d 517, 530 (E.D. Va. 1998); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. US West Communications, Inc., No. C971508R, slip op. at 27 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
143
See Local Competition Report and Order, 61 Fed. Reg. at
45,553.
144
See id.
145
See id. (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); In re Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); Federal Power Commission
v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, 411 U.S. 458
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fiscation by the ILECs were premature at best because no rates had yet been adopted through statutorily mandated arbitration by the states under
146
the TELRIC formula.
Regardless, the FCC went on to state that the
rates adopted under TELRIC would survive constitutional challenge. 147

Noting that under Sec-

tions 251(c) (2) and (3) of the 1996 Act, "incumbent LECs must establish rates for
interconnection and unbundled elements that
are just and reasonable," the FCC argued that
preventing a carrier from recovering all of its
costs is not alone confiscatory. 148 The FCC noted
that rates which reduce the value of property are
not necessarily invalid. 149 Without providing a
specific citation the FCC explained that the rule
in Hope Natural Gas simply requires that the "overall regulatory framework" enables LECs to realize
150
a profit.
In response to the argument that the TELRIC
pricing methodology should be judged under the
standard of just compensation usually applied to
physical takings of property, as opposed to the
standard used for exercises of the government police power, the FCC argued that even if it were
prescribing such a physical taking, TELRIC satisfies the just compensation standard. 5 1 The FCC
argued that since 'just compensation is normally
measured by the fair market value of the property
subject to the taking,"'152 and TELRIC attempts to
replicate rates in a competitive market, 153 the
pricing methodology that it adopted provides for
just compensation. 154 Stating that at least one
(1973);Jersey Central Power & Light v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
146
Under Section 252 of the Act, if parties negotiating
rates for unbundled elements are unable to reach an agreement, either on their own or through voluntary mediation,

within a specified period of time, they may either voluntarily
agree to or will eventually will be forced to enter into
mandatory state arbitration of rates, which will be binding on
them. See 47 U.S.C. § 252. Both arbitrated and voluntarily
negotiated agreements must be submitted for approval to the
appropriate state regulator. Id. § 252(e) (1). If a state does
not act upon arbitrated rates within a specified period, the

FCC may intervene and conduct its own arbitration proceedings. Id. § 252(e) (5). The decisions of these regulatory bodies are appealable to the appropriate U.S. District Court. Id.
§ 252(e) (6).
147
148

See 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,553.
Id.

See id. (citing Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 601).
Id. In Hope Natural Gas, the Court stated that "[i]f
the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust
and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an
149
150

end." 320 U.S. at 602.
151
See 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,553.

United States Court of
constitutionality of a
methodology, the FCC
will provide ILECs with

Appeals has upheld the
forward-looking pricing
concluded that TELRIC
a fair return on their in-

vestment (i.e., just compensation).

155

The FCC

further concluded that ILECs may seek relief
from the TELRIC pricing methodology if they can
show that under TELRIC their rates will be confis156

catory.

V. ANALYSIS: DOES TELRIC PRICING OF
UNBUNDLED ELEMENTS CONSTITUTE
A TAKING?
A. Whether the 1996 Act Prescribes the
Physical Invasion of Private Property Is
Unclear
Section 251 of the 1996 Act requires that incumbent LECs provide requesting telecommunications carriers nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis. 157 The

1996 Act at Section 251 (c) (6) requires that ILECs
provide physical collocation of equipment necessary for access to unbundled elements.' 58

How-

ever, section 251(c)(6) also states that an ILEC
may provide virtual collocation 59 if it can show
that physical collocation is not practical for technical reasons.160

Ultimately, ILECs must provide

one or the other. 16 1
In Loretto the Court ruled that a permanent
physical invasion of private property, however minor or minute, is a per se taking and requires just
152

Id.(citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374

(1942)).
See 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,553.
See Id.
155
See id. (citing Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 792 F.2d 287, 297 (2d Cir. 1986)).
156
See Local Competition Report and Order, 61 Fed. Reg. At
15'

154

45,553.
157

See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (3).

158

Seeld. at 251(c)(6).

With virtual collocation, the connection is done from
sites near the telephone central offices, but not within them.
151)

160

"Under virtual collocation, interconnectors are al-

lowed to designate central office transmission equipment
dedicated to their use, as well as to monitor and control their
circuits terminating in the LEC central office. Interconnectors, however, do not pay for the incumbent's floor space
under virtual collocation arrangements and have no right to
enter the LEC central office." 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,534.
'61
Cf FCC Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 250-54 (discussing
the Court's refusal to apply the Takings Clause to regulation
that simply govern the terms of voluntary commercial relationship).
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compensation.'" 2

Under virtual collocation, even

though the interconnector does not own the
equipment in the ILEC's central office, it does
own the circuits terminating into the office.'

63

If

the Court finds that the virtual collocation requirement does involve such a government-authorized invasion, however minute, Section
251 (c) (6) would be ruled a physical taking of private property for a public purpose, and requiring
just compensation. This will require a finding
that the virtual collocation requirement, in which
ILECs must permit interconnecting carriers to
terminate their circuits in the LEC's central office, 164 constitutes such a physical invasion.1 6 5
On the other hand, it is unlikely that such a
conclusion could be reached if the Court treats
the rule in GTE Northwest v. Public Utility Commission as a modification of Loretto. In GTE Northwest,
the Court ruled that a statute requiring physical
collocation constituted a physical taking of property for public use.1 66 Unlike the statute in GTE
Northwest, the 1996 Act does not require physical
collocation in all situations. 167 In addition, under
virtual collocation the interconnector does not
own the equipment in the ILEC's central office.
Thus, it would appear that Section 251(c) (6) of
the 1996 Act does not satisfy part two of the GTE
Northwest three-part test,'16

which requires that

the LEC not own the equipment on its property
dedicated to the interconnector's use.' 6 9 However, by stating that "collocation 'can be characterized as a physical invasion by the government'
for the three reasons provided" in the opinion,' 7 ° the rule in GTE Northwest seemed to leave
open the possibility that collocation can be characterized as a physical invasion for other reasons,
or that other forms of collocation can be physical
162
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 427 (1981); see also supra text accompanying
notes 80-87.
163
See Local Competition Report and Order, 61 Fed. Reg. at
45,534 (1996).
164 See id.
165
Under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, virtual
collocation may be a physical invasion of ILEC property since
it requires ILECs to permit interconnecting carriers to terminate their circuits in the ILEC's central office-a "permanent
physical invasion" of LEC property, "however minute." See
generally Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-39. The Court would be creating new precedent in doing so.
166
GTE Northwest Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 900 P.2d
495, 501 (Or. 1995).
167
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (6).
168
See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
169
See GTE Northwest Inc., 900 P.2d at 503.
170
See id.
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invasions.1 71 In short, Loretto and GTE Northwest
provide the Court with wide discretion in deciding whether or not virtual collocation constitutes
a physical taking of ILEC property, requiring just
compensation.

B.

The FCC Correctly Notes That, Absent
Rates, the TELRIC Methodology Can Not
Alone Constitute a Taking

If challengers to the Local Competition Report and
Orderare able to prove that it prescribes a physical
taking of property, they will be confronted with
the equally difficult task of showing that the
TELRIC methodology is confiscatory. However,
in the absence of a rate, whether TELRIC unbundled elements pricing is confiscatory is irrelevant.
In the Local Competition Report and Order, the FCC
noted that it is the impact of the rate order that
1 72
matters, not the theory upon which it is based.
In Iowa Utilities Board, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit characterized the ILEC takings
claim as not ripe without confiscatory rates actually imposed. 1 73 As Hope Natural Gas held, the
rate must prevent the entity as a whole from re1 74
covering a sufficient return on investment.
Although US West, GTE, SNET and other petitioners to the Court of Appeals would disagree,
the case law clearly supports this conclusion. As
the Court in Duquesne most recently concluded,
the Constitution provides regulators wide latitude
in deciding what rate methodology is in the best
interest of the utility and consumers. 1 75 Thus, because TELRIC is simply a methodology for developing unbundled element rates, it could not
alone violate the Takings Clause. 76 Without a
171

See id. (emphasis added) (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at

426).
172

61 Fed. Reg. at 45,553; see also Hope Natural Gas, 320

U.S. at 602.
173 Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818

(8 h

Cir.

1997), rev'd, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., - U.S. __
1999 WL 24568 (Jan. 25, 1999).
174 See Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602-03; Illinois Bell
Telephone Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
175 Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 314 ("[t]he Constitution . . . leaves [regulators] free to decide what ratesetting
methodology best meets their needs in balancing the interests of the utility and the public.").
176

It is critical to note that Supreme Court will not apply

the takings clause to voluntary commercial relationships. See
supra note 35. Thus, if an ILEC and a new entrant voluntarily
negotiate rates for unbundled elements under the TELRIC
methodology, any agreement they enter into will not be protected by the Takings Clause. See id. TELRIC derived rates
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rate these claims are simply not ripe for review. 177
Of course, if the rate adopted does not provide
the ILEC with sufficient compensation, TELRIC
would be ruled a per se confiscatory takings
under Lucas.

C.

If Changes in Takings Clause Scrutiny in
the Land Use Context Are Applied to the
Common Carriage Context, TELRIC Could
Be Invalidated

If TELRIC methodology is not per se confiscatory (i.e., represents the fair market value and enables the entity as a whole to realize a profit), the
Supreme Court should nonetheless apply the
most recent tests to the common carriage context.
Even though the Supreme Court has recognized
the unique nature of rate-making and Takings
Clause scrutiny of it,178 regulators have not been
immune from the just compensation requirement. 179 In fact, the development of Takings
Clause jurisprudence in this context has largely
coincided with changes that have occurred in
land use takings jurisprudence. 18 0
As discussed previously, the early rate-making
Takings Clause cases, which preceded by over
thirty years the Supreme Court's recognition of
regulations that go "too far" in regulating land
use, were a response to the ever increasing reach
of the regulatory state. 8 1 These cases recognized
that there are limits to the state's legitimate right
to regulate the rates of public utilities. The
Supreme Court viewed its role as ensuring that
these limits were not exceeded. Thisjudicial oversight has incrementally expanded, as has the regulation of private property use. Moreover, since
Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court has ac-

corded private property owners putting their
property to private use the same protection as private property owners putting their property to
would have to be imposed on the ILEC in a mandatory arbitration or by a state regulator in order for it to be protected
by the Takings Clause. See id.
177
In GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, the United States District Court for the Eastern District for Virginia went as far as
to hold that such a claim would not be ripe for review until
permanent (not just interim) rates were adopted. 6 F. Supp.
2d 517, 530 (E.D. Va. 1998). This position appears to contradict the United States Supreme Court's rule in First English
EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
in which it held that temporary regulations can violate the
Takings Clause. 482 U.S. 304, 317-18, 322 (1987).
179

See supra text accompanying note 89-92.
See supra text accompanying notes 94-119.

180

See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.

178

public use.' 82
The abundance of regulations adopted by the
FCC following passage of the 1996 Act graphically
illustrates that the reach of the regulatory state in
the common carriage context will not recede in
the near future. Furthermore, although the telecommunications industry is increasingly competitive, it is hardly deregulated-especially in the
provision of local telephony. Thus, any rationale
for providing telecommunications regulators
greater deference under the Takings Clause is at
the very least premature.
With that in mind, it would not be surprising if
the Supreme Court applied some form of the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests to a
rate that was not per se confiscatory. The Court
would first require an essential nexus between the
purpose of the unbundled element pricing methodology, increased local competition and lower
prices, and the TELRIC pricing methodology itself. The Court would also look at whether the
sacrifices (if any) the ILECs make in the sale of
unbundled elements to potential competitors at
TELRIC are roughly proportional to any benefits
they may derive from the 1996 Act. Sacrifices
would likely consist of lost revenues on the sale of
unbundled elements to end users and possible
loss of market share, while the benefits would include the ability to enter into the interexchange
marketplace in exchange for enabling competitors to enter the local marketplace, a provision of
the 1996 Act.1 83 An additional benefit may in18 4
clude the receipt of universal service subsidies.
It is unclear how such sacrifices or losses and ben8 5
efits could be quantified, as Dolan requires.'
The Local Competition Report and Orderdid not provide such a quantification, nor have state Orders
adopting these pricing methodologies. As the
Court in Dolan indicated, in the absence of such
86
quantification a regulation will be invalidated.'
181

See supra notes 90-91; see also McKnight supra note 44.
If the precedentially high degree of takings clause
protection provided in Loretto is any indication of how the
Court will act in the common carrier takings context, it
would appear that changes in the land use area will have a
significant effect on Takings Clause protections afforded
common carriers in rate regulation. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39. Loretto, which occurred during the Nollan,
Lucas, Dolan line of cases, extended takings clause protections to physical invasions, however minute. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
183 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-72.
184
See id. at § 254.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
186
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395-96
182
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If the these tests were applied to a rate adopted
pursuant to a TELRIC pricing methodology, the
Court could invalidate it because no quantified
showing of rough proportionality was made. Of
course, such a ruling would not prevent a regulator from issuing another Order in which TELRIC
was adopted and which provided such quantification. To prevent such an outcome, regulators
should include such an analysis in any of their
UNE rate-making orders.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Hope Natural Gas, the Supreme Court recognized that rate orders, by virtue of being issued by
a governmental body, carry a presumption of va(1994).
Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S.
591, 602 (1944) (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388, 401 (1938); Lindheimer v. Illinois
187
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lidity.1 8 7 This sort of deference, however, may be
a thing of the past. As discussed, once rates are
adopted, ILECs will be provided with an opportunity to challenge forward-looking unbundled element pricing methodologies. Even if the rates
adopted are not per se confiscatory, a court following precedent may choose to apply the essential nexus and rough proportionality test to the
Order. If an Order adopting such methodology
does not contain the required quantification, it
may be ruled unconstitutional. As an insurance
policy against such a constitutional challenge, regulators adopting such costing methodologies and
accompanying rates should include these additional analyses.

Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 169 (1934); Railroad Commission
v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., 212 U.S. 414

(1909)).

